U.S. Support Program Priority Statements

May 14, 2008

 

USSP Mission

 

The United States Support Program (USSP) will assist the IAEA in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, consistent with U.S. safeguards and nonproliferation policy, by providing financial support and technical expertise.
 

Vision Statement

 

To ensure the maximum benefit to the IAEA’s Safeguards mission, the USSP will build a broad and responsive technological base from the U.S. public and private sectors that targets central and technically demanding safeguards challenges, including:

  1. developing technologies that advance measurement, monitoring and systems standardization efforts;

  2. working with IAEA and manufacturers to ensure the delivery of highly functional, cost effective and reliable safeguards equipment;

  3. encouraging and supporting a life-cycle approach for modernizing and managing safeguards equipment and the use of road mapping to identify future needs;

  4. providing enhanced and cost effective information processing and analytical capabilities;

  5. developing efficient and effective solutions to address the IAEA’s unique safeguards challenges;

  6. becoming familiar with technologies not yet utilized by the Department of Safeguards and assessing them for use in international safeguards activities; and

  7. meeting specialized non-routine and routine needs by sponsoring cost-free expert, consultant and junior professional assignments, and training and recruiting regular staff.

        

Priority Statements

  1. Quality Management

  2. Human Resources and Training

  3. Non-Destructive Assay

  4. Containment and Surveillance

  5. Analysis and Evaluation of Inspection Samples

  6. Safeguards Concepts and Implementation

  7. Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis

 

 

Quality Management

 

Objective:  Support the Department of Safeguards with implementation of a comprehensive Quality Management System (QMS) that will provide sound safeguards conclusions regarding the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and, as appropriate, the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

 

Basis:  An effective QMS will strengthen Member States' confidence in the safeguards conclusions drawn by the IAEA, minimize the number of non-value-added activities and eliminate duplication of effort. The USSP will work with the IAEA to implement a QMS based on standardized processes and continual improvement of both the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department’s verification and evaluation activities. The aim is to implement and maintain a comprehensive Departmental QMS that will be consistent with the applicable requirements of the ISO 9001:2000 standard. The USSP will work with the IAEA Safeguards Department to achieve its quality goals for continuous improvement in performance practices, capabilities, and results. We will also work with the IAEA to provide the highest quality and reliability required from IAEA facilities, systems and equipment used to obtain safeguards conclusions; encourage long-range planning to modernize and manage safeguards technology; and identify innovative ways to meet the Agency's functional requirements. 

 

Strategies:

Tactical Goals:

 

Human Resources and Training

 

Objective: Ensure that the Department of Safeguards has an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA’s technical needs. Provide Department of Safeguards personnel with appropriate training to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. Increase U.S. representation at the IAEA to meet U.S. objectives.

 

Basis: The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective.  New safeguards procedures are required and experienced inspectors must be trained in the new procedures.  The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment and those who perform information collection and analysis. The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses.

 

A challenge facing the Department of Safeguards with respect to inspector training involves the unprecedented attrition of safeguards inspectors. Large numbers of experienced inspectors have been retiring, and this trend will continue for a few more years. The situation is further strained by the United Nations’ rotation policy.  As a result, the institutional knowledge and the average experience level are decreasing. The Section for Safeguards Training must strive to provide and facilitate basic and advanced inspector courses at an accelerated rate.

 

The rate of attrition over the next several years will require the IAEA to recruit and place individuals at an aggressive rate.  It is not always possible for the IAEA to find the appropriate mix of education, skills, and experience required for the positions.  To fill gaps resulting from departing staff and the inability to successfully recruit a full complement of regular staff, the IAEA needs cost free experts (CFEs), consultants, and junior professional officers (JPOs) to assist with the IAEA’s workload. The IAEA also should start succession planning as early as possible, especially in technical areas where key skills are rare worldwide.

 

In February 28, 2008, U.S. representation at the IAEA was 12.0%, as compared to 11.3% in March 2005. As of February 28, 2008, U.S. citizens are filling 12.7% of the professional positions subject to geographic distribution within the Department of Safeguards.  Overall the U.S. would like to increase the percentage of U.S. citizens working at the IAEA to 14.0%.  The United States is focusing on identifying well-qualified U.S. citizens for IAEA vacancies in the Operations and Support Divisions.  When recruiting inspectors, it is important to recruit at the P-3 level, as well as more senior levels, since most current senior IAEA inspectors are recruited from within the organization.  Also, there are key positions in the Support Divisions that require or benefit from inspection experience.

 

Strategies: 

 

Tactical Goals:

1)      Identify well-qualified U.S. citizens for IAEA Safeguards regular staff positions and experts as needed, and develop tools, brochures, and policy position papers for recruiting.

2)      Design a brochure to inform candidates regarding the issue of Employment Opportunities for Spouses.

3)      Revise and update the ISPO’s, “Working for the IAEA – A Guide for US Citizens”, including a section for JPOs.

4)      Sustain the recruiting program for JPOs.

5)      Participate in NA-24 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative activities related to human resources.

 

          

 

Non-Destructive Assay

 

Objective:  To maintain and strengthen the IAEA’s ability to use non-destructive assay (NDA) as a safeguards tool.

 

Basis:  Many of the IAEA’s NDA systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems.  Increasingly, these systems operate autonomously and send analytical data to IAEA headquarters. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness.  One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer and the facility operator to create a successful, cost-effective system. 

 

NDA equipment externally measures the radiation being emitted from nuclear material. These nuclear safeguards measurements are used to identify and quantify specific nuclear isotope presence. NDA related work includes all equipment from the instrument making the measurement, the equipment processing this information (AMSR, MiniGRAND, ILON, JSR, etc.) and all software that processes the data and presents the data to the inspector.

 

Strategies:

Tactical Goals:

 

 

Containment and Surveillance

 

Objective: Improve the capabilities, reliability and cost-effectiveness of containment and surveillance (C/S) systems for unattended and remotely monitored use.

 

Basis:  Many of the IAEA’s containment and surveillance systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems that may include active seals, instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. Increasingly, these systems operate autonomously and send analytical data to IAEA headquarters. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness.  The individual containment and surveillance subsystems are continually evolving as well. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer and the facility operator to create a successful, cost-effective system. 

 

Containment strategies, which are most often satisfied through the use of tamper-indicating devices, such as seals, are vital to ensuring that the IAEA’s equipment and storage areas under safeguards have not been compromised by a break in continuity of knowledge. Most of the IAEA’s seals have been in use for many years.  Some seals are being updated or replaced with the aim of reducing vulnerability and increasing the ability to verify the seal either in-situ or remotely. A new concept, yet to be implemented, is the idea of using the intrinsic properties of a container or building to make it tamper resistant, or by incorporating tamper indicating mechanisms into container or building design.

 

Video surveillance has long played a critical role in maintaining continuity of knowledge on safeguarded nuclear material in order to avoid the need for frequent re-measurements that would otherwise be needed to detect certain diversions.  There are longstanding problems of system reliability involving the loss of power and illumination and ambiguous movement, as well as occasional performance problems that cause anomalies that are difficult to resolve. 

 

The USSP also supports the development and implementation of technologies for increasing the number of standardized containment and surveillance systems operating in unattended and remotely monitored configurations. Associated challenges are the reduction in the number of different types of equipment and regular updating and verification of system documentation for inspectors and maintenance staff.

 

In near the future safeguards will have to address the growth of complex fuel cycle facilities under integrated safeguards, the spread of nuclear power stations to new states, and very likely the monitoring of facilities in states of interest.  All of these will require the continued use of C/S systems.  The continuing demands on the IAEA for more effective safeguards using constrained resources will require leaning heavily on technical solutions that do not come with a big maintenance cost.

 

Integrated safeguards will likely resort increasingly on less frequent, randomized inspections; such inspections often become ineffective unless they are coupled with unattended and/remotely monitored equipment to maintain continuity of knowledge, requiring extremely reliable, yet easily maintained C/S equipment.

 

Complex and sensitive fuel cycle facilities will likely require the combinations of C/S devices working together with radiation monitors and other sensors, possibly for joint use by the state and the IAEA. The spread of power reactors to a wide spectrum of states requires surveillance systems which provide clear information regarding spent fuel pool operations, including the ability to: tolerate ambient radiation levels,  work in poor lighting conditions, operate with radiation and other sensors, and provide high-resolution images based on a number of triggering modes, and operate for long periods with extremely high reliability.

 

Strategies:

Tactical Goals:

Performance Measure:

1)      Complete Task E.144, “Metal Seal Wire Verification Probe.”

Performance Measure:

1)      Consider funding Task E.147, “Material Maintenance System Software Update” project.

Performance Measure:

1)      Consider funding request E.146.xx, “Change Detection Software (CDS) Applied to Containment Verification Application.”

Performance Measure:

1)      Complete Task E.154, “Vulnerability Assessment of the Ultra Sonic Sealing Bolt” and Task E.145, “VOID-3 Vulnerability Assessment.”

2)      Consider funding future IAEA requested vulnerability assessments.

Performance Measure:

1)      Consider funding 07/TSR-004, “Expert – Remote Monitoring”

2)      Consider funding replacement for Task E.148, “Senior Sealing Systems Engineer” CFE if requested.

3)      Consider funding replacement for Task E.139, “Digital Image Surveillance & Remote Monitoring” CFE if requested.

 

 

Analysis and Evaluation of Inspection Samples

 

Objective:  To strengthen the IAEA’s ability to effectively use destructive analysis and particle analysis as a safeguards tool.

 

Basis:   The IAEA Department of Safeguards relies on the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at the nearby Seibersdorf Laboratory and the associated Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL), housed in many Member States, to conduct destructive analysis (DA) of IAEA inspection samples in order to verify correctness and completeness of a State's declaration.  Safeguards inspectors are responsible for collecting samples, and Safeguards support divisions are responsible for distributing them for analysis, and evaluating the analysis results for input to Safeguards’ verification reports. The U.S. Support Program has traditionally supported destructive analysis in areas of training, development and improvement of analytical methods, and provision of instrumentation and expertise.

 

The analysis of nuclear material samples from declared nuclear facilities, associated with traditional safeguards inspections, yields information about the correctness of a State’s declaration in the operation of its nuclear facilities and nuclear material storage areas.  In particular, measurements of nuclear materials from declared facilities provides precise information for bias defect assessments and are key in accurately verifying the material balance in some bulk handling facilities. Key analytical techniques include titration, coulometry, gravimetric analysis, mass spectrometry, and densitometry.  Associated functions include calibration of standards to verify non-destructive (NDA) equipment, verification of operators’ measurement equipment, overseeing quality assurance for on-site laboratory measurements, and preparation and validation of large-sized dried spikes for assay determination of liquid waste samples from reprocessing plants.  SAL currently analyzes 95% of these inspection samples with no backup in the NWAL.  This was identified as a weakness by the November 2006 SAL workshop participants. 

 

The IAEA’s environmental sampling program is used by Safeguards operations divisions in the implementation of a strengthened safeguards system.  Analysis of environmental samples can help detect and identify undeclared nuclear activities.  Environmental sample analysis techniques include high resolution gamma spectroscopy and particle analysis using mass spectrometry.   Location-specific environmental sampling can identify activities at a particular facility, site, or other locations, and is permitted under comprehensive safeguards agreements and at a wider range of locations under the Additional Protocol.  Further, the number of complementary access inspections is increasing under the Additional Protocol, and the inspectors are sending back new types of samples (soil, vegetation, water, metal, air filters, etc.)  that might require new analysis protocols and methods to determine elemental compositions in addition to uranium and plutonium; the composition and concentration of minor isotopes and daughter isotopes of uranium and plutonium; and physical properties including color, grain size distribution, and microstructure.

 

The environmental sampling program includes sample collection, sample processing, laboratory quality control, and data evaluation.  SAL's Clean Laboratory is responsible for certifying and providing IAEA inspectors with sample collection kits, for sample screening, and for distributing samples for analysis to the NWAL, in which U.S. laboratories are the leading participants.  The Department of Safeguards selects inspection samples, quality control blanks, and standards for distribution to SAL and the NWAL.  SAL and the NWAL laboratories analyze these environmental and particle samples and report their results to Safeguards.

 

The keys to maintaining effectiveness of inspection sample analysis and evaluation include judicious planning for sample collection (types and number of samples collected), improving measurement sensitivity and quality control, selecting and maintaining appropriate tools, controlling costs, and maintaining a highly qualified and efficient workforce. 

 

In recent Board papers and Secretariat briefings, the IAEA has recommended building a new safeguards laboratory, buying new SIMS machines, and examining the relationship between SAL and the NWAL.  The U.S. supports making sound technical judgments on these questions, but they are otherwise beyond the scope of this paper.

 

 

Strategies:

 

Tactical Goals:

 

Performance Measures: 

1)      Facilitate provision of plutonium references materials requested under Task A.263.

2)      Under Task A.202, facilitate meeting between the IAEA and Russia for negotiation of the contract for separation of the plutonium reference materials.

3)      Continue support of A.218, “Controlled Potential Coulometry of 3 – 5 mg Pu with SRL Coulometer,” and consider support if asked to assist Japan at the On-Site Laboratory in adopting coulometry as a standard practice and as a way to significantly reduce use of rare and expensive Pu reference materials

4)      Support training in estimating uncertainty in measurement for SAL and IAEA staff

5)      Continue support of A.264, “Analytical Quality Control – Participation of SAL in NBL SME Program.”

6)      Complete task A.268, “Improvement of NWAL Capability in Gamma Spectrometer Analysis for U/Pu and Fission and Activation Products.”

Performance Measures:

1)      Continue to hold periodic interagency meetings and meet with MSSP counterparts as necessary to discuss requests from the IAEA for assistance at SAL. 

2)      Assist the IAEA in strengthening the NWAL by supporting NWAL role evaluation and risk studies

3)      Study the feasibility of maintaining SAL’s SIMS instrumentation and assist the IAEA in developing a reasonable life-extension plan to ensure SIMS capability until a new instrument is purchased.

Performance Measures: 

1)      Place a JPO and CFE in SGTS who can assist in the NWAL expansion and risk analysis evaluation study now underway in the Department of Safeguards. 

2)      Continue support for the SAL laboratory information management system project when needed.  A US CFE is managing this project.  Other support is provided under D.156, “Software Development Support:  LIMS for the SAL.”

3)      Provide a CFE in SGIM to train new environmental sample analysis evaluators.  This is supported under A.275, Environmental Sampling Support.”

4)      Provide clean laboratory training for new SAL staff.

5)   Provide access to U.S. sources of training that can help existing SAL staff increase their abilities.

 

 

Safeguards Concepts and Implementation

 

Objective:  Support the development and implementation of effective and efficient safeguards approaches and verification measures that address challenges posed by new and unique facilities and that support implementation of State-level Approaches.

 

Basis:  With the completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards -- defined as the optimal combination of traditional safeguards and the Additional Protocol – the IAEA’s work has shifted to the development and implementation of the State-Level Approach.  The Agency has also returned to the question of improving its capability to detect undeclared nuclear facilities, materials and activities under INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements.  The Agency is constantly pressured to take a more flexible approach to safeguards implementation, which would allow it to focus more of its effort on countries of interest. The IAEA is periodically faced with implementing safeguards at facilities that are unique in size, purpose, construction or undergoing decommissioning.  Examples of facilities that are currently being addressed by the IAEA that could benefit from expert assistance include the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, the J-MOX Plant, the Chernobyl Conditioning Facility and Dry Storage Facility, and Pebble Bed Modular Reactors.  Finally, the Agency exerts pressure on itself to identify and apply new technologies and methods to existing and future safeguards needs.

 

In its early years, the USSP provided significant support to the development and enhancement of statistical analysis tools.  A new project in the 2008-2009 R&D Program is SGIM-08, “R&D for Statistical Analysis,” which “describes the plans for developing and implementing new statistical analysis tools needed for improving the evaluation of safeguards accountancy and verification data and for supporting various safeguards activities involving statistical concepts.”  There are opportunities for the USSP to assist with near real time accounting, upgrading of the sampling plan code, enhancement of the material balance evaluation reporting system, and simulation of the nuclear material balances for bulk handling facilities. 

 

The IAEA will continue to rely on the use of technology from MSSPs to make the most efficient use of limited inspection resources. In 2005, the IAEA established Project SGTS-08 to increase its ability to detect the presence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. The consideration of new or novel technologies by the USSP will be based on proven cost and performance analyses. The USSP is willing to undertake such projects within the limits of available resources and where such projects provide cost-effective solutions for increasing the effectiveness and credibility of the safeguards system.

 

Strategies: 

Tactical Goals:

Performance Measures:

1)      Continue to provide senior safeguards experts as consultants to the IAEA as needed.

2)      Participate in the IAEA’s Workshop on Safeguards by Design.

Performance Measures:

1)     Consider funding of projects for evaluation of novel technologies that were introduced to the IAEA in 2006 during the IAEA’s visit to the U.S. national laboratories and during the 2007 Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards.

Performance measures:

1)      Provide cost-free expert assistance

2)      Give preferential consideration to request related to IAEA’s project to develop a Universal NDA Data Acquisition Platform that will simplify the application of resources at J-MOX.

3)      Evaluate other IAEA requests for support in this area.

Performance Measures:

1)      Discuss statistical analysis tools needed by the IAEA.

2)      Identify experts qualified to support the IAEA in this area.

3)      Review and respond to IAEA requests in this area.

 

Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis

 

Objective: Support the IAEA in achieving an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information.

 

Basis:  The Department of Safeguards’ Information Management Division (SGIM) missions embrace all aspects of providing, maintaining, and using the tools for Safeguards-related information collection, analysis, and management.  It is currently in the process of replacing its obsolete computer platforms while also incorporating new tools and methods, strengthening its information security culture and systems, and modernizing analysis reporting to keep pace with evolving Safeguards’ approaches to nuclear verification.  Specific projects associated with these efforts include the Integrated Safeguards Environment (SGIM-01), which is closely aligned with the IAEA Safeguards Information Re-engineering Project (IRP), as well as Commercial Satellite Imagery (SGIM-02), Open Sources Information (SGIM-03), and Enhanced Information Analysis Architecture (SGIM-06).

 

The IAEA is in the third and final phase of a project to re-engineer its obsolete safeguards information system (ISIS) to create an integrated, efficient, and secure safeguards information infrastructure.  Phase III of the project, which is expected to take at least two more years, is concerned with developing and implementing the safeguards application software and rolling out these systems as they are completed.  The work is managed by the IAEA and performed by the IAEA and its contractors.   The USSP pledged $9M million and also applied the accrued 2006 interest from the United States Voluntary Contribution to IAEA Safeguards, which amounts to 50% of the extrabudgetary portion of the project budget.  Other Member States have also contributed directly or in-kind.  The remaining funding comes from the IAEA’s regular budget.

 

While the IRP is a major focus of SGIM efforts in the next two years, the IAEA will need to maintain current information systems and maintain and strengthen its ability to provide information services to support safeguards operations. This includes a continuing expansion of information analysis activities in support of strengthened safeguards, in particular the compilation and use of State Evaluation Reports (SERs).  SERs are critical both for planning safeguards implementation and for drawing safeguards conclusions. The IAEA’s capabilities in information collection and analysis need to expand and mature. As the amount of open-source information collection and analysis involved in producing SERs has increased, especially with the increase in the number of Member States with model Additional Protocols in force, the IAEA wants to streamline and automate its information collection and analysis process to ensure the same quality contribution to SERs. In addition, the IAEA needs effective information security and quality management systems and practices to maintain the confidentiality of sensitive safeguards information.  To design an enhanced information analysis architecture, the IAEA has created a project called nVision, to which the USSP has contributed expertise and other assistance.  A complementary effort is the upgrade of the Satellite Imagery Unit’s tool set, which the USSP has also partially supported.  The USSP has also provided CFEs, JPOs, and shorter term experts to support collection and analysis of open-source information.

 

Strategies:

Tactical goals:
 

            Performance measures:

            1) Provide consultants and JPOs.

            2)  Identify and/or develop training for Agency staff designated to act as analysts.

            3)  Assist with identification and assessment of new tools.

            Performance measures:

            1)  Recruit a JPO to assist with automated translation projects.

            2)  Address other related requests as submitted.

            Performance measures:

1)   Support the IAEA workshop on satellite imagery technologies.

2)   Provide assistance to the IAEA during upgrade of the satellite imagery analysis laboratory.

3)   Address other related requests as submitted.

            Performance measures:

1)   Continue support of IT Security Architecture CFE

2)      Continue support of CFE and JPO assistance to IRP projects

3)      Address requests for assistance in strengthening software quality management areas (documentation, testing, training, etc.)

            4)   Give preferential consideration to requests for additional IT hardware security assistance, including vulnerability assessments and training.