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A Guide Book for U.S. Citizens Who are Going to Workat the International Atomic Energy Agency in SafeguardsJanuary 2003
Eighth Edition DISCLAIMER I would like to thank the many people who contributed to the present edition. The ISPO staff made numerous suggestions and provided much updated information. Ms. N. Maier-de Ridder at the Agency furnished detailed data about the benefits plans for personnel and Ms. S. Carlsen, assisting ISPO on a part-time basis, and Ms. M. Rabatin, the ISPO Senior Administrative Assistant, with great patience and forbearance, prepared the manuscript. The authors welcome any suggestions and/or comments that could improve the usefulness of this Guidebook to members of the safeguards community that are planning to work for the IAEA in Vienna. L.E.
Each year several U.S. citizens - about 10 or so - go to work in the
Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Some go as experts provided to the Agency on a cost-free basis by the
U.S. Government - so-called "cost-free experts" or CFEs -
and some as regular Agency staff members. For many appointees, this
is their first experience in living and working abroad. In addition,
they will be working in a unique environment, an international, UN-affiliated
agency responsible for the promotion and control of the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy around the world. Their positions will, therefore,
have both political and technical aspects. From a personal and a professional
standpoint, as well as that of U.S. non-proliferation policy, it is
important that the new staff member perform effectively in this environment.
To help assure this, the orientation program of which this guidebook
is a part, was developed under the auspices of the U.S. Program of Technical
Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). Its purpose is to assist the
new appointee to prepare for the move to Vienna and working at the IAEA.
Recognizing the importance of the impact of family adjustment to the
new environment on job performance, the orientation program is directed
to both the staff member and spouse. The guidebook is intended to be used as both a reference and, for some, preparation for a series of oral briefings in Washington, D.C., which is given to new appointees and their spouses over a period of 2-3 days. The following are the six main subject headings in the guidebook:
2. The IAEA 3. POTAS 4. Working at the IAEA 5. Moving to Vienna
6. Living in Vienna
If you will be
attending the oral briefings, please note that topics 1-3 are covered
in the briefings by officials of the U.S. Government and personnel of
the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO), which is in charge
of the technical management of POTAS and is based at Brookhaven National
Laboratory. Briefings on Topics 4-6 will be given by persons who have
lived in Vienna and are thoroughly versed in both the practical and
cultural aspects of life in the Austrian capital. Adapting to the cultural
transition of the move to Vienna will be addressed by an expert in the
area of what is termed "culture shock". As seen from this list of main subject headings and the more detailed list in the Table of Contents, this guidebook covers a wide range of topics. Since the IAEA offers an indoctrination course for all new hires which includes many of the same topics, it was decided to emphasize here and in the briefings those topics which the Agency of necessity could not cover, and also those which would best assist in the advance preparations of the new staff member and in the initial transition phase of the move to Vienna. It also was recognized that since the Agency course is scheduled at 10 to12 week intervals, considerable time might elapse between arrival of the new staff member and the next offering of the course; hence, even if certain topics were covered again and in more detail in the Agency program it might still be valuable to introduce them in the POTAS briefings. No guidebook of manageable size can cover all the topics listed in adequate depth. Therefore, a list of references is given which the prospective staff member and spouse should consult for more detailed, authoritative information. In addition, several basic documents are provided gratis along with the guidebook. These include IAEA reports describing the Agency's role and safeguards system, documents with information on working conditions and administrative matters at the IAEA, a book on Austria by a knowledgeable American living there, an excellent, well-illustrated "Insight Guide" to Vienna, and the inestimable practical guide, Living in Vienna, a gold mine of information for newcomers to the city, published by the American Women's Association. This guidebook has freely used that work, mainly by drawing the reader's attention to certain specific topics it covers. The new staff member and spouse can do no better than to read the original, cover to cover. The initial impetus for the design of the orientation program and much subsequent encouragement and advice was provided by Dr. Kenneth Sanders, formerly of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and currently the Director, International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation of the U.S. Department of Energy. We thank him for his continued interest and support. 1.1 History of Efforts to Control Nuclear Energy 1.1.1 Atoms-for-Peace Proposal During World War II and for almost ten years thereafter, the U.S. Government followed a policy of secrecy about its nuclear energy activities. That policy allowed only limited exceptions for sharing information on certain military-related programs with Canada and the United Kingdom because of their cooperation during the war. The general policy of secrecy was intended to deny information relevant to the production of nuclear weapons to everyone domestic or foreign, except those authorized by the U.S. Government to receive it. The United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom issued a joint declaration in November
1945, calling upon the United Nations (UN) to set up a commission to
make specific proposals for preventing the use of atomic energy for
destructive purposes, while promoting the exchange of basic scientific
information for peaceful purposes. No progress was made on any proposals
for international control until December 1953, when President Eisenhower
delivered his famous address to the UN General Assembly which has become
known as the "Atoms for Peace" speech. The amount of nuclear material contributed to the IAEA has never been substantial and, thus, the primary objective set forth in the speech was not achieved. Nevertheless, the establishment of the IAEA and the evolution of its safeguards function (discussed in Section 2) has made an enormous contribution to efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while fostering international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The speech at the UN was followed in the United States by the passage by Congress of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which permitted, for the first time, general exchanges with other governments of nuclear materials, equipment, and information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, under specified conditions and formal agreements. There is no doubt that the Atoms for Peace program carried out by the United States pursuant to the 1954 Act changed the course of history. Among other features, the program resulted in the conclusion of bilateral agreements for cooperation with about 20 governments before the establishment of the IAEA in 1957. 1.1.2 Bilateral Agreements Although it was not required by the 1954 Act, the Executive Branch, and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) in particular, decided that nuclear materials and equipment provided by the United States under agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be subject to safeguards, including inspection by U.S. personnel.* The purpose of such inspections was to verify that the material and equipment were being used in the recipient country only for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the guarantee given by that government in the agreement for cooperation. The broad rights for U.S. inspectors included in such agreements represented an unprecedented intrusion into the sovereignty of the recipient governments. The USAEC established a small staff of full-time inspectors who planned and carried out the inspections pursuant to the bilateral agreements for cooperation. The experience gained by the United States in carrying out its safeguards function under bilateral agreements was instrumental in the design and evolution of the safeguards function of the IAEA. That process proceeded cautiously with the adoption by the IAEA's Board of Governors in 1961 of INFCIRC/26 (which addressed only small research reactors) to the extensive system set forth in INFCIRC/66/REV. 23, completed in 1968, and INFCIRC/1534, published in 1972. As IAEA safeguards operations became sufficiently codified and active, the United States began to implement a provision in many of its bilateral agreements calling for the transfer of responsibility to the IAEA, by mutual agreement of the parties, for the safeguarding of materials and equipment supplied by the United States to the other government. The arrangements for the IAEA's assumption of responsibility for safeguards were formalized in agreements to which the two governments and the IAEA are parties, known as "safeguards transfer" or "trilateral" agreements. In the case of a non- nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT), the trilateral agreement was suspended in favor of the safeguards agreement by that government with the IAEA, required by the NPT. Thus, for many years, the United States has not carried out safeguards on materials and equipment it supplies to other countries for peaceful purposes. However, it retains the right to do so if IAEA safeguards are not being applied for any reason in the recipient country. 1.1.3 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons By the mid-1960s, it became apparent that in many countries nuclear energy was being increasingly considered as a practical, economical means for producing electricity in central generating plants. It was recognized that if such applications came into wide-spread use, fissionable material - particularly plutonium - would become abundantly available. While the mere availability of fissionable material might not lead a government to seek to produce nuclear weapons, it could facilitate a decision to do so on political or military grounds. At this time, a Limited Test Ban Treaty, negotiated in 1963 by the United States and the USSR, had become widely accepted. Furthermore, at the IAEA, the USSR had abandoned its hostility and suspicion of the Agency's safeguards activities in favor of supporting and encouraging their evolution and implementation. The coincidence of these developments, together with other political trends, led both countries to undertake the negotiation of a treaty seeking to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to countries beyond the five that had already demonstrated their possession. Negotiations were completed in the spring of 1968, when the text was endorsed by the UN General Assembly. The Treaty was signed on July 1 of that year by the United States, USSR, United Kingdom and about 60 other governments, but not China or France (they acceded to the NPT in 1992). The Treaty established two categories of possible parties: 1) nuclear-weapon states, defined such that only the five mentioned above could qualify, and 2) non-nuclear-weapon states, i.e., all states other than those five. According to the treaty, a nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes (Article I) not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or control over them, and not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or acquire them. A non-nuclear-weapon state party undertakes (Article II) not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or the transfer of control over them, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire them and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture. One of the most controversial provisions in the negotiation of the NPT was Article III under which each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes to enter into an agreement with the IAEA for the application of the Agency's safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities, wherever carried out. Among the difficulties in negotiating Article III was the prior existence of EURATOM, an organization established by the Treaty of Rome to apply safeguards in all the states of the European Community, originally consisting of six members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Since then, nine other states have joined the community, which is now called the European Union: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Principles for reconciling the two safeguards systems - EURATOM's and the IAEA's - and for establishing relations between the IAEA and a regional association of states instead of with individual states had to be worked out. These problems eventually were satisfactorily resolved by the conclusion of an agreement providing for joint conduct of inspections of EURATOM facilities by IAEA and EURATOM inspectors, while preserving the basic principle of independent IAEA verification. A more general objection by many industrialized non-nuclear- weapon states, including members of the European Community, was that the nuclear industries of nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT, since they were not required to be under IAEA safeguards, would have a commercial advantage in international competition with industries in non-nuclear-weapon states. That objection was effectively overcome by parallel voluntary offers by the United States and the United Kingdom to permit the IAEA, at such time that it was applying its safeguards generally in non-nuclear-weapon states pursuant to the NPT, to apply its safeguards in all U.S. (and UK), nuclear activities, excluding only those significant to national security. Each offer is being implemented pursuant to an agreement with the IAEA, under which the IAEA is free to apply its safeguards, for example, to any of more than 200 activities in the United States. In the mid-nineties, the U.S. Government went one step further, in allowing access by the Agency to excess fissile material that had been removed from weapons stocks. China, France, and the Russian Federation also have concluded agreements with the IAEA under which the IAEA is to apply safeguards in specified facilities designated by the respective government.
The NPT, which
took effect in 1970, had a 25-year lifetime. Accordingly, in 1995 the
NPT Review and Extension Conference was held and in May of that year
the treaty was extended indefinitely. Today, there are nearly 190 parties
to the treaty. The states not party to the NPT are Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan.* Brazil and Argentina which recently acceded to the treaty, previously had agreed to a system of mutual inspection of all their nuclear facilities, setting up for that purpose an organization called ABACC, from the Spanish initials of the name, Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. A four-party agreement between the IAEA, ABACC, and those two countries for safeguards conducted jointly by the IAEA and ABACC (in an arrangement somewhat resembling that between the IAEA and EURATOM), entered into force in 1994. The NPT is the main multi-lateral agreement that aims to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, but not the only one. There are several regional treaties, such as those of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Antarctica, and, as mentioned above, EURATOM. These will be briefly described below. Finally, several bi-lateral agreements also are in effect, notably those between the United States and EURATOM, the United States and Japan, and the United States and Australia. 1.1.4 Treaty of Tlatelolco Before the NPT was negotiated, Latin American governments, led by Brazil and Mexico, had addressed the possibility of establishing that region as a nuclear-weapon- free-zone. The text of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was completed in 1967, and entered into force in 1968. It became known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the district of Mexico City where the key negotiations had taken place. The 38 states (including the five original weapons states) party to the Treaty undertake to use their nuclear material and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes, not to acquire nuclear weapons, nor to permit them on their territories. Each party also undertakes, among other provisions, to enter into an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to its nuclear activities. 1.1.5 Treaty of Rarotonga This agreement, also known as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, stationing, or testing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of the parties, or the dumping of radioactive wastes into the waters of the zone. The treaty also requires the signatories to apply full scope IAEA safeguards to all of their peaceful nuclear activities. The treaty went into force at the end of 1986 with 16 states and freely associated governments presently party to the treaty (including Australia and the five weapons states). 1.1.6 The Pelindaba Treaty The treaty, signed in Egypt in April 1996, prohibits its parties from conducting research, developing, stockpiling, testing, stationing, acquiring, possessing or controlling any explosive nuclear device in Africa. It also prohibits the dumping of radioactive wastes within the nuclear weapon-free zone. Like the other treaties discussed above, it obligates its parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Currently there are 50 signatories. 1.1.7 The Antarctic Treaty The first regional nuclear weapon-free zone was established in June 1961 by the Antarctic Treaty. It prohibits nuclear explosives, disposal of radioactive waste, and any military uses of the region, defined to be the area below the 60 degree South parallel. The Antarctic Treaty has an unlimited duration and stipulates that the region shall be used solely for peaceful purposes. There are currently 41 parties to the treaty, including the five nuclear-weapons states. 1.1.8 Guidelines for Nuclear Exports In Article III of the NPT, each party, whether a nuclear-weapon state or not, undertakes not to provide nuclear material or specially designed equipment for producing or using special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon state unless the nuclear material is subject to IAEA safeguards. To ensure a minimum standard of conduct by NPT parties in discharging that obligation, two groups evolved: the Zangger Committee, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Zangger Committee Sometimes known as the NPT Explorers Committee, the Zangger Committee now has 31 member states. In 1974, the committee developed guidelines for implementing Article III, including lists of materials and items of equipment which could be transferred to a non-nuclear weapon state only if the special nuclear material was subject to safeguards in the recipient country under an agreement by its government with the IAEA. The document is revised periodically and forms the IAEA’s INFCIRC/2095 series.
Nuclear Suppliers Group This group, also referred to as the London Suppliers Group, has 35 nuclear-supplier nations. It was convened in the mid-1970s, following the detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974. A main reason for forming this group was to include France, a major nuclear-supplier nation that was not then a party to the NPT. The group made public its guidelines in 1978 which paralleled those of the Zangger Committee but went further by including items of technology, by calling for restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear-technology, and by specifying levels of physical-protection measures to be applied to the listed nuclear material and facilities by the recipient country’s government. The documentation of the committee’s work comprises the Agency’s INFCIRC/2546 series. Both groups of suppliers continue to function as vehicles for consultation on and refinement of, nuclear-export policies. Their efforts have made important contribution toward avoiding the possibility that safeguards requirements and non-proliferation assurances required for exports would become elements of commercial competition. 1.2 United States and International Safeguards 1.2.1 Support of the IAEA As might have been expected from the IAEA's origin in President Eisenhower's initiative, the United States has been active and influential in the organization, beginning with the drafting of its Statute and continuing throughout its more than 40 years of operation. While supporting a broad range of its activities, the United States has been particularly interested in the development of IAEA safeguards. Its experience with bilateral safeguards had demonstrated the advantages of an international safeguards system for assuring other governments that peaceful nuclear activities in a country remained peaceful. Moreover, only an international system can provide the basis for establishing the minimum standards of conduct necessary to permit international trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The alternative - each exporting state applying its own version of safeguards, or none at all - would at best have been chaotic, and, at worst, would have resulted in the decline of standards of export conduct to the lowest common denominator. In either case, the cause of non-proliferation would likely have suffered. Predictably, governments have differed in the importance each attached to the various functions of the Agency, in accordance with its national interests. Nevertheless, and to a greater extent than in other international organizations, the IAEA's Board of Governors, its policy-making body, has been able to maintain a tradition of making decisions by consensus, rather than by formal voting. Undoubtedly, legitimate differences of view will continue to be expressed about the philosophy and execution of various Agency activities, not excluding its safeguards function. For example, when the matter of safeguards to be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities in each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT was discussed in 1970, representatives of some industrialized states advocated an arrangement whereby the IAEA would merely check the functioning of national or regional safeguards systems to assure that they were performing satisfactorily. Under that approach, successfully resisted by the United States and others, only random inspections would have been carried out by the IAEA and would not have been able to make independent judgments on diversions. Currently, there are different views about the amount and kinds of information to be made available to the member states (or to the general public) on the results of IAEA safeguards operations. Some states, in the interest of preserving the credibility of IAEA safeguards, advocate releasing as much information as possible. Others resist and oppose efforts to amend the provisions in the Agency's safeguards system and in its agreements that ensure the confidentiality of information obtained by the IAEA in applying its safeguards. Disagreements also continue about the costs of safeguards and which members should bear what portion of those costs, the process of designating inspectors, their training and duties, the reliability of safeguards equipment, and other aspects of the IAEA's safeguards activities. That is not to say that the IAEA is in disarray or that it is paralyzed by indecision. The point being made is that, at any given time, serious issues are being debated by member states about Agency activities. As in any bureaucracy, some of those issues are debated among the staff as well. New staff members should be aware that many of the topics being discussed are complex and come with a history. Accordingly, it would be well to seek out the relevant information, as well as opinions from a variety of experienced sources, before reaching a personal conclusion. 1.2.2 The U.S. Mission to the IAEA Like many other members of the IAEA, the U.S. government maintains an office in Vienna to provide day-to-day contact with, and representation to, the IAEA. Such duties are carried out for most member states by embassy personnel, in addition to their work in connection with relations with Austria. In the case of the United States and some other governments, including the UK, the Russian Federation, and Germany, separate diplomatic offices or "missions" represent their interests to the IAEA and the UN-related agencies (principally, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization or UNIDO) in Vienna. The U.S. Mission is located at Obersteinergasse 11 in the 19th district, a popular residential area northwest of the city center, within easy reach of the Vienna International Center (VIC). The local telephone number is 31-339. (The U.S. Embassy is located at Boltzmanngasse 16 in the 9th district). The Mission is headed by an Ambassador appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. He or she is assisted by a staff of officers of whom four deal exclusively with IAEA matters, while some of the others are assigned to deal with certain aspects of all of the international organizations, including the IAEA. The Mission provides liaison with the IAEA, evaluates and reports on IAEA plans and activities, consults with the representatives of other governments, and in other ways advances the interests of the U.S. government in the IAEA. All officers in the U.S. Mission are employees of the Department of State. Some will be Foreign Service Officers or other career employees of the Department of State, while others may be on loan to the Department from another agency, such as the Department of Energy (DOE), or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Mission reports to, and receives instructions from, the Department of State. Within the Department, several offices have major interests in the IAEA, including the Bureau of International Organizations, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Non-Proliferation. The Department of Energy and the NRC also have continuing interests in many IAEA activities, are kept informed of developments, and are consulted by the Department of State in preparing its instructions to the Mission. The ISPO liaison person in Vienna also is attached to the Mission. Officers of the Mission can be found frequently at the IAEA, meeting with staff members on Agency matters or in topical meetings. The Mission will be particularly busy preceding and during meetings of the Board of Governors, its committees, and the General Conference. It is advisable for newly arrived U.S.-citizen IAEA staff appointees and cost-free experts to introduce themselves to one or more officers of the Mission, perhaps by taking the initiative to meet for lunch at the VIC. Such a meeting would provide an opportunity for the staff member to obtain information about the Mission personnel and their individual functions. Thereby, the staff member could learn who in the Mission might be interested in dealing with a particular matter in the future, about which the Mission could be legitimately consulted. 1.2.3 NPT and IAEA Safeguards The controversy over including in the NPT the requirement for mandatory IAEA safeguards in connection with all peaceful nuclear activities in each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty was noted in Sec. 1.1.3. The effect on the IAEA of the inclusion of that provision, and its implementation for the many non-nuclear-weapon states which joined the treaty, has been revolutionary. It changed the Agency from a small technical organization with an annual budget of less than $10 million and a staff of several hundred, to a highly visible one, with a budget of $275 million in 1998 and about 2,200 employees (including approximately 1750 regular full-time staff and 450 consultants, cost-free experts, and others serving on a reimbursable basis). Safeguards costs alone were $95 million.
With
high visibility has come increased scrutiny from all sides - skeptics and
enthusiasts - and complaints either that IAEA safeguards were too intrusive, that
the money would better be spent on assistance to less-developed countries,
or conversely, that safeguards were ineffective since they could not
prevent a state accumulating large quantities of plutonium. The experience in Iraq and the DPRK prompted the Agency to adopt techniques beyond traditional methods. These include broader access to relevant information from all sources, and the introduction of environmental sampling, remote and unattended monitoring, and challenge inspections.
1. Congressional
Record, Vol. 100, Jan. 7, 1954, pp. 61-63. 2. INFCIRC/26:
The Agency's Safeguards System, IAEA, Vienna, 1961. 3. INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2: The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968), IAEA, Vienna, Sept. 16, 1968. 4. INFCIRC/153 Corrected: The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA, Vienna, 1972. 5. INFCIRC/209: Communications Received from Members Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material, IAEA, Vienna, 3 Sept. 1974 (Numerous addenda and modifications since then). 6. INFCIRC/254:
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, IAEA, Vienna, 1978.
Mason Willrich,
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control,
The Michie Company, Charlottesville, VA. 1969. David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, Taylor & Francis, London and Philadelphia, 1985.
2.1 History Within months after President Eisenhower's December 1953 address to the UN General Assembly, the United States began consulting with other governments to establish an international agency. An initial draft of a Statute (i.e., charter) for such an agency was drawn up in March 1954. Two-and-a-half years and several drafts later, a Statute acceptable to all parties was finally produced and was signed on October 1956 by 70 governments. In June 1957, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification and a bill providing for U.S. participation (P.L. 85‑177, 71 Stat. 453) was enacted shortly thereafter. In late July 1957, the Statute had been ratified by the requisite number (18) of governments and the IAEA formally came into being. The number of Member States increased steadily since then and currently stands at 134. The IAEA never fulfilled the purpose of establishing and administering a significant pool of nuclear material, as proposed by President Eisenhower (see Sec. 1.1.1), despite initial U.S. contributions of enriched uranium and a pledge to match all other contributions. Among other factors, the assumption that uranium raw material and fissionable material would remain scarce and thereby limit exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes proved wrong. Nevertheless, the IAEA, as foreseen in its Statute, had other functions to carry out, such as the exchange and dissemination of information, the provision of training and technical assistance, in addition to the application of safeguards. 2.2 Relationship to the United Nations
The IAEA is not a specialized agency of the UN, such as the World Health
Organization (WHO) or the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), but rather
is an autonomous and independent body. Members of the UN are not automatically
members of the IAEA, or vice versa. To become a member of the IAEA, a
government must adopt the Statute of the IAEA and apply to, and be accepted by,
the IAEA General Conference as a member upon the recommendation of the Board of
Governors. Moreover, the IAEA is funded by direct assessment of its members,
rather than through the budget of the United Nations or any of its organs. Article XVI of the Statute authorizes the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, to provide for consideration by the Agency, resolutions of the General Assembly and other UN organs, and the submission of reports, when requested, on resulting action by the IAEA. The Agency concluded such agreements with the U.N. and also has engaged in jointly funded and staffed activities with a number of specialized agencies and programs of the UN, such as WHO, FAO, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and UN Environment Program (UNEP). It also has administered, for a fee, projects of the UN Development Program (UNDP).
2.3 Dual Role of the IAEA "The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose". Before the advent of the NPT, all but a handful of IAEA staff were concerned exclusively with "promotional" activities; there were few situations in which IAEA was called upon to apply safeguards. During that early period, however, important steps were taken to codify and systematize the safeguards system. During the 1960s, the Board of Governors adopted a series of documents defining the Agency’s safeguards function. The current version of one important series, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 1, remains the controlling document for IAEA’s application of safeguards on individual facilities in countries not obligated by treaty or otherwise to place all of their facilities under IAEA safeguards. The great increase in safeguards personnel, from 220 in 1959 to about 600 now, occurred during the 1970s as demand was generated by adherence to the NPT of many non-nuclear-weapon states engaged in significant peaceful nuclear activities. By 2002 the regular budget of the Department of Safeguards totaled over $80 million. Under the special formula for assessments to fund safeguards activities which has been in effect since 1972, members having the lowest per-capita national income bear only 2.5 percent of total safeguards costs, while the remaining 97.5 percent is borne by members having the highest per-capita national income. Thus, as a practical matter, the wealthier members pay for the lion’s share of safeguards’ costs. The dual roles of promoting nuclear energy and applying safeguards also have prompted the criticism that in pursuing both, the Agency is faced with a conflict of interest of the kind that eventually resulted in the splitting up of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission into two separate agencies (DOE and NRC). However, it is important to note several differences between the IAEA and the U.S. agencies: (1) the IAEA is a voluntary organization with no enforcement or regulatory powers, (2) a large part of the "promotional" activity is in support of non‑power applications of atomic energy e.g., the use of radio‑isotopes in medicine, agriculture, and hydrology, training in nuclear physics in developing countries, and (3) for many members, the technical assistance is the quid pro quo for accepting safeguards. Any attempt at this stage to split the IAEA into a regulatory agency and a promotional one would undoubtedly encounter intense opposition. 2.4 Membership and Politics For admission to the IAEA a government must adopt the IAEA Statute and be accepted as a member by the IAEA General Conference upon recommendation by the Board of Governors. The applicant is not required to be a member of the UN, nor does membership in the UN confer any benefit or obligation with respect to the IAEA. For example, Switzerland has been a member of the IAEA since the Agency’s inception but only recently (2002) joined the U.N. On the other hand, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not an IAEA member state, but does belong (since 1991) to the UN (and is also a party to the NPT). The IAEA has emerged from relative obscurity as a technical organization under the domination of atomic‑energy specialists from its member states to become one of those forums in which international politics are played. In conjunction with that development, members of the Agency have become associated with a number of groups ‑ unofficial ones but having genuine political agendas. The largest of those groups is the Group of 77, or G‑77, which was formed in 1964 at the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to coordinate and expound the views of the developing countries on economic development, and to have those views reflected in the UN system. Since 1970, the G‑77 (which, includes more than 100 countries at the UN) has sought to use its influence toward establishing a New International Economic Order in all international organizations. This effort includes the increased representation of G‑77 members in the governing bodies of the organizations, such as the Board of Governors, and in the staff, particularly in senior positions. In the IAEA, the G‑77 also seeks to increase the resources available for technical assistance, to avoid restrictions or conditions on its availability, and generally, to shift the burden of financing the Agency's activities to other members. The most significant effect of the G‑77 seen to date in the Agency may be the introduction of bloc voting on many issues, as opposed to the consensus process which was traditional in the Agency. There are also regional sub‑groups of the G‑77 in the Agency ‑ one for Latin American members, and another for members from Africa. On the other hand, there is the Geneva Group, made up of the major contributors to international organizations, who consult on budget policy, and the West European and Other Group (WEOG) which includes Australia, Japan, Canada, and the United States. While each group has its own agenda, the interests of two or more may coincide on a particular issue. 2.5 Organization of the IAEA Figure 2-1 shows the organizational structure of the IAEA. The Secretariat is comprised of six departments, as depicted in the Figure, and is discussed in Section 2.5.2. 2.5.1 Governing Bodies The policy-making organs of the IAEA are the General Conference and the Board of Governors. Working jointly, these two bodies decide the Agency’s program, specify its budget and appoint its Director General. The General Conference is comprised of representatives of all of its 134 member states and meets annually in September. The Board of Governors has 35 members; 13 are designated by the Board and 22 are elected by the General Conference. The Board of Governors meets three times per year, usually in November/December, March and June.
2.5.1.1 Board of Governors The Board of Governors was designed to be the most important body of the Agency. The Statute assigns more functions and authority to the Board of Governors than is done for the policy‑making organs of other international organizations. It formulates the annual budget, which the General Conference can only approve in toto or reject, sending it back to the Board of Governors (which it has never done). The Board appoints the Director General, with the approval of the General Conference, recommends to the General Conference applicants for membership, authorizes the Director General to enter into specific agreements for projects and safeguards, approves the designation of staff members to serve as safeguards inspectors, approves the issuance of safety codes and standards, reviews the implementation of safeguards and other programs, and submits an annual report to the General Conference covering all of the Agency's activities. In short, the Board, in the words of Article VI.F of the Statute, has the "authority to carry out the functions of the Agency in accordance with this Statute, subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference as provided in this Statute." The composition of the Board of Governors was much debated during the drafting of the Statute. What emerged was a compromise between those members that were either advanced in nuclear technology or had uranium deposits, and those with neither. The 35‑member Board is currently selected as follows:
Ten members "most
advanced in the technology of atomic energy, including the production of source
material" are designated each June, for a one-year term, by the outgoing Board.
The outgoing Board then designates three more members from "most advanced states" that did not produce a designee in the first ten, who will also serve for one year. Traditionally, the distinction between the first 10 and remaining three designees is blurred. In addition to the 13 one‑year members designated by the Board, the General Conference each year elects eleven members to serve two‑year terms. The twenty‑two members elected over each two‑year cycle are distributed, according to a formula set forth in Article VI of the Statute. Usually, there is agreement among the members in various geographic regions as to which candidates will be elected to the Board. The notable exception is the Middle East region; Israel has never been nominated for election to the Board.
2.5.1.2 General Conference The most influential formal actions by the Conference have been based upon its authority, set forth in Article V, to propose matters for consideration by the Board and to request reports from the Board on any matter relating to the function of the Agency.
2.5.2 The Secretariat The staff of the Agency is commonly referred to as the Secretariat. It is headed by the Director General (referred to informally as the DG) who is appointed to a four‑year term by the Board of Governors with the approval of the General Conference. There are six Deputy Directors General (DDGs), one over each of the following Departments: Management, Technical Cooperation, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Safety and Security, Nuclear Sciences and Applications, and Safeguards. (See Figure 2‑2.) Appointments of DDGs (normally for five years subject to extension) are the subject of consultations by the DG with interested member states and finally with the Board of Governors in closed session; i.e., only the Governors present. Each Department is made up of divisions which are further divided into sections; some sections are broken down further into units. Division directors (grade D‑1 or D‑2) are appointed for an initial term of three years, subject to renewal for a two‑year term. The DG consults the Board of Governors in closed session on such appointments. Currently, there are 24 divisions. Section heads, of which there are almost 100, are at the P‑5 grade and are appointed for the standard three‑year plus two‑year terms. However, some appointments have been extended for successive five‑year terms or, in fewer cases, individuals have been granted long-term contracts, which is the equivalent of permanent status. Other staff members are classified as either professional (grades P‑1 through P‑5), general service (GS, which includes secretarial, clerical and other support personnel), or maintenance and operating (M & O). The distribution of these three categories in the IAEA staff is generally about 40%, 55%, and 5%, respectively, totaling about 1650 people. In addition to the staff who fill the positions identified above, the Agency employs other personnel, usually with qualifications similar to those for positions in the professional category, under other arrangements. The largest number are hired under Special Service Agreements for short‑term assignments (weeks or months) as experts for Technical Assistance work in developing member states. Others hired under Special Service Agreements include "cost‑free" experts; i.e., individuals provided by member states for specific functions or tasks, at the request of the Agency and whose salaries and allowances are reimbursed to the Agency by the Member State. Such cost‑free experts are commonly found in the Department of Safeguards, many from the United States, where they normally serve two or more years. A few consultants also will be found at the Agency at any time, usually engaged in a defined study or other specific task, on contracts with terms of less than one year. These additional personnel amount to about 550, bringing the overall total in the secretariat to 2200. The United States has made an effort to maintain a reasonable numerical representation among the positions subject to geographic distribution, in keeping with its status as the member state having the highest assessment. The U.S. assessment is about one quarter of the total IAEA budget and so is entitled to one quarter of the authorized geographically distributed posts. However, currently U.S. citizens account for only about 14% of the professional positions.
2.5.3 Department of Safeguards The Deputy Director General of the Department of Safeguards (DDG-SG) is responsible for applying safeguards under agreements to which the IAEA is a party. This responsibility involves establishing safeguards approaches and then implementing safeguards practices so as to achieve safeguards objectives effectively and efficiently. The Office of the DDG-SG includes staff to assist in preparing the annual Safeguards Implementation Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, in developing new criteria for implementing and evaluating safeguards, and in preparing management, personnel and financial policies for the Department. The staff of the department is currently almost 600. There are six divisions within the Department of Safeguards, three of which (Operations A, B, and C) are responsible for carrying out the IAEA's independent on-site verifications (see Fig. 2-3), and account for three-quarters of the regular budget of the Department. The remaining three divisions (referred to as "support divisions”) provide the equipment, information services, planning, training and analysis assistance and other support required by the operations divisions.
2.5.3.1 Operations Divisions The three operations divisions have equal status and responsibility for applying safeguards in the countries assigned to them. The present structure reflects both functional and geographic considerations. In general, Operations A covers the Far Eastern, Southeast Asian, and Austral-Asian countries, Operations B includes Africa, North and South America, the Middle East, and Norway and Switzerland (non-EU countries). Operations C operates in the European Union countries, the Russian Federation, and former Eastern Bloc countries. About half of the personnel in the department work in these operations divisions. Each operations division is further divided into four sections, each with different functions. For example, in Operations A, Section OAP is in charge of procedures and support ‑ that is, for the adaptation and implementation of procedures used by inspectors during their verifications. Section OA1 is responsible for the verification of "item" facilities in Japan; facilities such as reactors, in which nuclear material exists only in discrete, identifiable form, such as fuel assemblies. Section OA2 is responsible for Japanese bulk‑handling facilities ‑ facilities such as fabrication and reprocessing plants in which nuclear material exists in bulk form. The Tokyo Regional Office acts as a staging area for those inspectors who reside in Japan. It also carries out many of the administrative functions relevant to the Asian theater of operations.
To carry out their
verification activities, the operations divisions must schedule, plan, and make
the inspections, evaluate the results, carry out follow-up activities, if
needed, and then report their findings. In addition to these principal tasks,
the operations personnel negotiate with individual governments or regional
multinational organizations the legal documents which provide the specific
bases for implementing safeguards in each country and each facility. In a
typical year, over 2,500 inspections may be carried out, covering 900
facilities worldwide. The three support divisions assist the operations divisions to fulfill their inspection responsibilities. In addition, the support divisions help to ensure that the work of the Department of Safeguards is effective and efficient. The largest support division, the Division of Safeguards Information Technology (SGIT), is responsible for the processing, storage, retrieval, and analyses of the safeguards information reported by the member states or collected by inspectors. The SGIT staff develops, maintains, and operates the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS), prepares data as requested for safeguards planning and evaluation, and provides a variety of information services to the staff of the Department of Safeguards. The division is currently involved in accessing, processing, analyzing and reporting on open source information relevant to the department’s safeguards function. Open sources include technical documents, media, acquisitions, and satellite surveillance photos. SGIT includes the Section for Software and Hardware Services (ISH), the Section for Information Support Services (IIS), and the Section for System Infrastructure Support (ISI). ISH is responsible for the continuing development of software to support all of the safeguards divisions’ staff. The section also provides hardware and software to upgrade the IAEA Safeguards Information System. IIS provides services for computer processing of a large variety of safeguards information, including material-accounting data reported by the member states, inspection data from the field, and facility design data. Recently, this section expanded into more sophisticated information “mining” techniques using large information databases. Finally, ISI staff are concerned with the reliability, security, accessibility, and maintenance of the computerized safeguards database. The Division of Technical Services (SGTS) has responsibility for developing, testing, procuring, shipping, maintaining and managing the equipment required by the Divisions of Operations. In addition, it provides oversight for development and documentation of equipment and material measurement procedures, and of instrumentation methods and techniques. It also acts as a liaison with the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) located at Seibersdorf. Finally, it is responsible for technical training. The Director of SGTS is additionally responsible for the administrative coordination of the activities of the national support programs through the Support Program Administration (SPA) office. The primary contact of POTAS with the Department of Safeguards is through the Director of SGTS via the SPA office. SGTS includes the Section for NDA Systems and Seals (TNS), the Section for Installed Systems (TIE), the Section for Common Technical Support (TCS), and the Section for Safeguards Training (TTR). The responsibility of TNS, as the name implies, is for specifying, developing, testing, evaluating and supporting NDA equipment and sealing devices. The development part of this responsibility is, in fact, largely provided by the national support programs and monitored by members of TNS. TIE is responsible for "providing inspectors with the instruments and equipment they need where they need it, when they need it, and properly maintained, calibrated, etc." TIE also acts as the liaison with the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL). TCS is responsible for procurement, inventory control, and management of safeguards equipment and supplies. It also coordinates sample analyses with SAL and the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL). TTR coordinates all training for the staff of the Department of Safeguards, as well as for personnel of Member States, as required. The Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP) is responsible for strategic planning and for the development and standardization of safeguards concepts, approaches, procedures, and practices. It supports the overall activities of the Department of Safeguards in analyzing and evaluating data leading to material balance evaluations. It also supports the quality assurance work of the Department of Safeguards. SGCP is comprised of the Section for Standardization (PST), the Section for System Studies (PSS), and the Section for Statistical Analysis (PSA). PST is responsible for standardizing safeguards procedures and policies, and maintaining the Safeguards Manual. It plays an important role in negotiating the Subsidiary Arrangements and the Facility Attachments. PSS develops the principles for the design of safeguards approaches and prepares the strategic plan for the Department of Safeguards. PSA provides general statistical support to the Department of Safeguards. An entity that contributes importantly to safeguards activities but is not a part of the Department of Safeguards is the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, organizationally in the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications and physically located in the outlying town of Seibersdorf. This laboratory analyzes the chemical and isotopic content of many samples of nuclear material taken during inspections.
2.6 Safeguards Implementation
2.6.1 Basic Authority and Restraints Article III A.5 of its Statute authorizes the Agency "...to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards at the request of the parties to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy." Under agreements that States conclude with the IAEA, Agency inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify records that State authorities keep on the whereabouts of nuclear material under their control, check IAEA-installed instruments and surveillance equipment, and confirm physical inventories of nuclear materials. They then prepare detailed reports for the State concerned and for the IAEA. Taken together, these and other safeguards measures provide independent, international verification that governments are not diverting material from their peaceful nuclear programs. The system consists of three major components:
A basic feature of safeguards is that verification can take place only on the basis of an agreement with the State in which the inspection occurs. The IAEA is not a supra-national organization with powers to impose its inspection on any State. Acceptance of safeguards is voluntary. It also is important to note that the Statute addresses only the matter of governments complying with undertakings or obligations set forth in formal agreements with the Agency. It does not give the Agency any responsibility or authority to address non‑national (e.g., terrorist) diversions of nuclear material or physical protection against threats of such diversions (except for material in the Agency's possession). Legal agreements are the basis of IAEA safeguards. Many are popularly known as full-scope agreements because they extend to all peaceful nuclear activities and materials in the State. As explained in Chapter 1 these agreements mainly relate to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), and to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (the Rarotonga Treaty). Other safeguards agreements cover individual nuclear installations or individual quantities of nuclear material. Currently, there are over 220 safeguards agreements in force in more than 135 States. The greater part of the safeguards activities is in those States where safeguards were being applied pursuant to full-scope safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153 type)2. Safeguards are also being applied to facilities, equipment, and non-nuclear material under agreements covering individual facilities (INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 type). Appendix A has a more detailed description of the safeguards agreements. After the Gulf War and the discovery of clandestine activities in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, it was clear that the “verification of non-diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear programs” of a State was not sufficient to ease concerns about proliferation. Measures for strengthening safeguards that were approved by the Board of Governors in 1992 included special inspections, early provision of design information, and specified equipment (GOV/2646). In 1993 an effort was begun at the Agency to determine how more stringent measures could be added to the “traditional safeguards.” This effort was named “Program 93+2 and eventually resulted in the writing of the “Additional Protocols,” embodied in INFCIRC/540.3 These are additional agreements that individual States can accede to which allow for generally more intrusive inspections and other measures to try to uncover undeclared nuclear activities. The blending of traditional safeguards with the newer initiatives, which include unattended radiation monitoring, remote monitoring, environmental surveillance, space imaging, and information mining, is referred to as “integrated safeguards.”
2.6.2 Safeguards Implementation Report One of the steps taken by the United States in the wake of the nuclear explosion carried out by India in mid‑1974 was to seek information from the Agency about the results of its safeguarding, in each recipient country, of U.S.‑supplied materials and equipment pursuant to the trilateral (safeguards transfer) agreement between the United States and the recipient government. The procedural difficulty foreseen by the Secretariat in providing such information directly to the United States led to a proposal by the latter that the Board of Governors request the Director General to regularly provide the Board with information on the results of all of the Agency's safeguards work. Accordingly, the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has been issued annually since 1977. While not identifying any State by name, the SIR contains a wealth of statistical data, organized primarily by types of facilities. The report is not published and is held closely by the governments represented on the Board; the summary is included in the Agency's Annual Report.
2.6.3 Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) In 1975, the Director General established a Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to assure the effective and non-discriminatory interpretation and application of safeguards. The Group originally consisted of 10 individuals, but the membership has now expanded to 17; the members usually serve for 3 years. Technically, members serve as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments. They usually are members of the safeguards establishment, official or unofficial, in their home countries and their views carry weight accordingly. It would be unrealistic to expect that governments would nominate candidates likely to oppose important official policy. The Deputy Director for Safeguards sits with the chairman during formal sessions of the Group; other members of the Secretariat attend by invitation, to provide information or advice. The agenda of the Group, which meets regularly twice a year, is determined by technical questions posed by the Secretariat via the Director General. The questions are often aimed at new kinds of facilities; others pose questions of general application. One of the first tasks undertaken by SAGSI was to provide technical guidance for interpreting terms found in INFCIRC/153, such as "timely detection", "significant quantity", and "risk of early detection". The quantitative expression of those terms became known as "detection goals". SAGSI also has addressed such questions as the application of safeguards to mixed‑oxide fuel fabrication and on‑load fueled reactors. Guidelines for inspections pursuant to agreements under INFCIRC/153 were provided in 1988; those for agreements under INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 were completed in 1989. More recently, SAGSI considered the possible application of unannounced random inspections so as to reduce the inspection workload while maintaining its effectiveness. In 1999 a meeting was convened to consider technical issues related to the prolif |